Blog | RCD

Railway Club Directory Monthly Blog

December 2023

A question we are often asked is how many railway related societies and clubs exist in the UK today.

As a directory of railway societies, we are well-placed to answer that question, although the nature of railway enthusiasm is such that it is not an easy question to answer.

Railway societies take a number of forms, from organisations with a formal structure with anywhere from 50 to one thousand members, to informal groups of perhaps a dozen or so individuals who share their interest, sometimes under a group name, but without a formal group structure in any strict sense.

The Railway Club Directory only lists railway societies and clubs that are formally constituted, and which are membership based, i.e., are generally open to the public to join as members. The RCD list is therefore an underestimation of the actual number of railway related groups that exist.

This is particularly so in respect of model railways groups. Whereas many modellers enjoy their hobby through a club, there are many modellers who work with just a select number of fellow modellers. Attend any model railway exhibition, and you will see model railways that have been built by such a group, sometimes under a group name, sometimes not. Additionally, there are many modelling groups that prefer to operate without public visibility, for various reasons including security.

Outside railway modelling, there are railway groups covering other aspects of railway enthusiasm that are not formally structured as clubs. Just one example of this is the The Linesiding Club, a collection of individuals who meet (usually on-line) when the fancy takes them, holding talks on railway subjects in a manner very similar to a traditional railway society (as that phrase is defined by the RCD).

There are literally thousands of railway related groups on social media, Facebook being just one example. Again these are not constituted as clubs, nor have a membership as such, but rather have adherers in a loose manner, as followers.

So how many formally constituted railway societies and clubs actually exist. In short, the RCD lists a little over 1,200 such societies, made up approximately as follows:

Traditional Railway Societies: 125

Rail user groups and campaign groups: 240

Heritage Railway, museum and railway infrastructure support groups: 140

Locomotive societies: 80

Model railway societies: 500

Model engineering railway societies: 150

As mentioned, the number of model railway societies listed is a large underestimation of the number that exist, believed to be nearer 800 if a looser definition of group is used.

So in conclusion, there are over 1,200 formally constituted railway related societies and clubs that exist in the UK today. Add to this less formalised groups (but excluding social media groups), and the number exceeds 1,500 and may be nearer 1,600.

What other form of hobby has so many clubs associated with it. Outside sport, probably none!

This makes railway enthusiasm somewhat unique, and has indeed become the subject of academic interest, with a number of books in recent times being written on the subject, including the well-known ‘British Railway Enthusiasm’ written by Ian Carter.

What is interesting is that much of that academic work has noted the aging demographic of railway society membership, and has for 30 years or so been forecasting their demise.

There are indeed demographic challenges for railway societies, yet despite a general trend of falling and aging membership (although there are many exceptions to this) the fact remains that the number of railway societies that exist today is about the same as 30 years ago. It seems that railway societies and clubs are more resilient than had been thought, or maybe the demographic time-bomb is still ticking!

For 1 December 2023

Blog Archive

November 2023

With Christmas just around the corner, this month’s monthly blog comprises a Christmas offer.

We have just 100 copies of the ‘National Directory of Traditional Railway Societies’ left for sale, our Christmas offer is as follows.

We will give away and post to you absolutely free of any charge a copy of the Directory to the first 20 people who contact us at richardbowry@railwayclubdirectory.com

Just send an email saying in effect that you claim a free copy of the Directory, and provide your name and postal address (with postcode included please). One Directory per email per person only.

Within 7 days we’ll post you a copy of the Directory, free of charge.

MERRY CHRISTMAS!

1 November 2023

October 2023

A Lesson in History (otherwise known as the HS2 Debacle)

Towards the end of September’s blog on the closure of the Somerset and Dorset Railway (see below), we likened the situation between 1955 and 1963, to the situation over the last 8 years to 2023. September’s blog concluded:

‘There are many lessons here. Modern railways need a significant subsidy and as such are at the mercy of, and subject to the whims of, government. Who would have thought in 1963 that a future government would, 60 years later, commit to spend up to £100 billion for a new high-speed railway of just 200 miles or so. Note however that the Beeching Report came only 8 years after the Government agreed to inject over £1 billion pounds into the railways under the 1955 modernisation plan. The tap can be turned off as quickly as it is turned on.’

In 1955 the Government committed £1.24 billion to the Modernisation Plan (about £30 billion in today’s money). Yet by the time of the 1963 ‘Re-shaping of British Railways Report’ it was recommending the closure of 5,000 miles of railway.

Eight years ago, the Government was committing huge sums to the building of a High Speed 2 from London to Manchester and Leeds. In January 2020 it launched the ‘Restoring Your Railway Fund’ intending to reverse Beeching era closures by re-opening lines, funded by an additional £500 million. Now in 2023, HS2 as envisaged has been scrapped. What we are left with is half a railway, running from Birmingham to London. How did that happen?

The answer is simple. Infrastructure projects, such as our railways, need long term vision because what is built will last 100 years or more and cost considerable sums of money. Politicians, on the other hand, operate on an election cycle of 5 years. It is therefore not surprising that our political class are shockingly bad at approving and then developing infrastructure projects.

It was clear from the outset that economically HS2 made a questionable business sense. If you calculated the maximum number of trains that could possibly run on the line and the maximum income, and hence contribution to capital, it could derive if all the trains were full, there was still a multi-billion-pound deficit. However with a bit of creative accounting it was possible to include in the calculation indirect economic benefits, which being incapable of accurate calculation, bore doubtful connection to reality. The business case for HS2 therefore relied on the concept of indirect economic benefit the railway might provide to the economies of the regions it served. The creative accounting was then repeated when the cost of the project (estimated at £36 billion in 2010) crept upwards. If the envisaged costs increased by £20 billion (as they did by 2015), suddenly and miraculously the indirect economic regional benefit also increased by £20 billion, and the shaky economic case was able to survive.

The truth is that HS2 was always a political project. The business case for HS2 was always marginal at best such that many saw failure to complete as envisaged as a real possibility.

Yes, it would be a very nice thing to have and many railway associated groups and enthusiasts supported it for that reason, but ultimately it’s business case was not proven. A considerable number of railway associated groups and enthusiasts did not support HS2 precisely for that reason, and the likelihood of the project not being completed once economic reality hit. Perhaps they are too polite to say, ‘I told you so.’

What should happen now? After all, half a railway is of limited value. Can you image having only half of the M1.

Surely the Government, or the one in waiting, should commit to at least reaching Manchester, even if all other aspects of the project are cancelled. We will then have a very expensive but useful high-speed railway linking London with the North West.

The alternative is a very expensive half railway to the Midlands, and even if that connects with the West Coast Main line west of Lichfield as might be possible, such a railway will be of far more limited use.

1 October 2023

September 2023

Something Different: A '1963' Critique of Beeching

Being 60 years since the publication of Dr. Richard Beeching’s ‘Re-shaping of British Railways Report’ in 1963, it was perhaps inevitable that at least one blog on this website this year would be dedicated to Beeching and the railway closures implemented in the 1960’s under the auspices of that report.

However, rather than judging Beeching 60 years after the event, perhaps it is fairer and more illuminating to consider the opponents of Beeching back in his own time, and to consider reports made by pressure groups and societies arguing against particular railway closures, examining their contemporary viewpoints and arguments.

An example where this is possible is the closure of the Somerset and Dorset Railway (S&D) which took place in March 1966. This is because the closure was opposed by the Branch Line Reinvigoration Society (‘BLRS’) and in October 1963 it issued a report relating to the proposed closure of the Somerset and Dorset Railway headed ‘A Financial Study of Certain Railway Passenger Services in Somerset, Dorset and Hampshire’. The BLRS Report dealt with a number of railways in the region, but this blog refers solely to the comments in it concerning the S&D.

The preface to the BLRS Report makes reference to the fact that proposals had been made by the British Railways Board for withdrawal of all passenger services between Bristol Temple Meads and Bournemouth West via Bath Green Park and also between Evercreech Junction and Highbridge.

The BLRS Report dealt solely with the economics of the S&D which requires some explanation. This was a consequence of the somewhat peculiar processes relating to the closure of railways at the time as contained in the Railways Act 1962, in particular the fact that the economic case for closure of a railway was reserved exclusively to British Railways and ultimately the Ministry of Transport. Any public enquiry relating to a closure was only to establish whether a given closure would result in hardship, a role to be undertaken by Transport Users’ Consultative Committees (‘TUCC’). Protesters were simply not allowed to protest on the actual grounds of a proposed closure, i.e., its perceived uneconomic performance.

The absurdity here is immediately apparent, as highlighted in the BLRS Report. In reality, closures were all about economics, so the key determining factor relating to a closure concerned economic performance. Yet no independent enquiry into the economics of a particular closure was permitted as part of the official closure process.

It got worse. British Railways were not obligated to furnish any information on the financial performance of a particular service proposed for closure, but how could they justify a closure without reference to economics? So in practice British Railways released very basic financial information, not in an effort to openly discuss economic performance, but as a means to ‘establish’ poor economic performance of a railway service, without having to explain the nature of the economic data nor entertain any discussion in respect of economics. In essence British Railways were able to have their cake and eat it by providing loss figures to justify a closure, without permitting any discussion to take place concerning those figures including the possibility of alternative arrangements which could affect economic performance. A political stitch up, by any other name.

The authors of the BLRS Report were not fooled by this approach. Economics was clearly key, and so British Railways economic data could not be, and would not be, simply accepted without comment, but had to be scrutinised, and scrutinised vigorously. This would prove difficult as British Railways withheld relevant financial information, but as mentioned above, some very basic financial information was usually provided to those who formally raised objections to a closure, and so became of public record.

This extraordinary situation was well put in the BLRS Report itself which stated as follows:

‘…we think it important that some attempt should be made to get at the real truth about the economics of these passenger services before it is too late. That the withdrawal will cause hardship we can well believe; this is considered by the Transport Users’ Consultative Committees. That the withdrawals are being pressed forward by British Railways without consideration of town and country planning requirements, local and national road congestion and future trends in population and industry is also true. A strong argument can be raised against rail closures on such grounds, but the basis on which closures are proposed is solely financial.’

The BLRS Report hit the nail on the head, and it was not side-tracked. It devoted itself entirely to the real, perhaps only, issue at hand, namely economic performance.

It is worth noting here the language used in the ‘Re-shaping of British Railways Report’, in particular the following:

‘It is proposed to close down routes which are so lightly loaded as to have no chance of paying their way, and to discontinue services which cannot be provided economically by rail.’

The Reshaping Report states that railways and services should be closed not because they do not pay their way, but because they have no chance of paying their way. These are two quite distinct things, necessitating an enquiry not just into economic performance as it currently exists, but economic performance as it could be.

As to the S&D economics, the BLRS Report quoted the key financial information that had been disclosed to the TUCC, which were as follows:

Revenue attributable to the line: £108,600p.a.

Direct costs: Movement: £327,100p.a.

Direct costs: Terminal (i.e., stations): £71,500p.a.

Also provided were ‘renewal expected to be required in the next 5 years’ as follows:

Permanent Way: £289,200

Signalling: £43,800

Buildings, bridges, etc: £28,180

The BLRS Report pointed out a series of issues with this data:

(i) Brief summarised figures give insufficient data to assess any failure and closure;

(ii) No indication is given as to the time period to which the data actually relates;

(iii) No indication as to how ‘revenue attributable to the line’ had been derived;

(iv) No indication as to whether ‘revenue attributable to the line’ relates just to passengers or includes other revenue (e.g., parcels and/or freight);

(v) The only other costs given were ‘movement’ and ‘terminal’ costs, with no explicit reference to track maintenance or signalling, other than in the context of renewals;

(vi) No details given as to the nature of the work comprising the renewal costs and 5-year breakdown (not reproduced above) which showed inconsistency.

The BLRS Report concluded that there was no purpose to the data given other than to claim that the railway loses £300,000 per year.

It is then pointed out that 5 critical questions relating to economic performance have not been considered:

1. Can train costs be cut?

2. Can fares be increased?

3. Can stations be closed?

4. Can track and signalling costs be cut?

5. Can services be improved and traffic increased?

Taking these in turn the BLRS Report commented as follows:

1. Can train costs be cut?

It was noted that all services remained steam operated, and that steam was an extremely expensive method of providing rail services. The Reshaping Report quoted 15 shillings per train mile as an average cost for such cases. The cost of running a diesel multiple unit varied, but it was noted that the Reshaping Report quoted four shillings per train mile as typical. A rail-bus service would be less. The BLRS Report thus concludes that the use of diesel multiple units on the S&D could cut movement costs by nearly 75%. This would be a saving of £240,000.

2. Can fares be increased?

The BLRS Report expresses surprise that this question is rarely asked by British Railways. In modern times with alternative pricing a norm, it seems an obvious question. Is it possible that higher fares will be acceptable to the travelling public in respect of services particular to a locality where a small premium would be deemed acceptable as it means to cover marginal costs?

3. Can stations be closed?

The BLRS Report refers to there being 29 stations on the S&D lines, excluding halts, and that the average station cost is quoted in the Reshaping Report as £2500 per year.

The BLRS Report suggests that all but six of the stations should be closed (see below for the stations to remain), and it commented ‘why such a step was not taken long ago is incomprehensible’.

4. Can track and signalling costs be cut?

As mentioned above, the authors of the BLRS noted there was uncertainty as to where these figures lay within the limited data provided by British Railways. It was noted, however, that:

(i) double track cost more than single track to maintain, and that 57 route miles of the S&D was double track;

(ii) Signal boxes were expensive, typically costing £1,500 per year per box, that there were 30 such boxes on the S&D which could readily be reduced to ten at the most.

5. Can services be improved and traffic increased?

It was noted that a service provided by diesel multiple units would be a ‘vast improvement’ especially if operated with a ‘re-casting of the current antique timetable’. Vast improvement was evidently possible. To its credit the BLRS Report refrained from estimating likely increases in traffic considering this ‘conjecture’.

Possible future working of the S&D was then suggested:

(a) Main line services could be operated by three two car DMUs, and the branch line by a single rail-bus;

(b) The main line could carry 7 trains daily (6,600 train miles per week), the branch line 4 trains (1,580 train miles per week);

(d) All stations to be closed except Blandford Forum, Sturminster Marshall, Wincanton, Shepton Mallet Radstock and Bath Green Park, and all stations on the branch except Glastonbury and Street;

(e) Crossing places will be retained at 10 places;

(f) Stationmasters will not be appointed at staffed stations but a ‘line manager’ for the entire route would exist. All station buildings will be rationalised to minimise cost.

The BLRS Report then set out likely costs of revised operations. In respect of the main line, these were as follows:

Movement costs:

DMUs (343,200 miles @£4 per mile) £68,640

Terminal costs:

8 x £2,500 Including Broadstone and Mangotsfield) £20,000

Track & signalling

73.75 x £3,500 £259,000

Total £347,640

As to receipts:

- it was noted that parcels, mail and newspapers would make some contribution (estimated at £21,800 per year);

- freight would cover its movement costs and make a contribution to track and signalling costs of £25,900 per year.

On the above basis, break even on passenger services would need to generate £299,940. In that regard it was noted that:

(1) £299,940 per year equalled £67 per mile per week for the main line;

(2) At 2d per mile average fare this equalled 8,040 passengers per week. At 3d per mile average fare this equalled 5,360 passengers per week (64 passengers per train).

(3) In the Beeching Report, the ‘Density of Passenger Traffic’ map shows a density of 5,000 to 10,000 passengers per week north of Templecombe, and less than 5,000 south to Bournemouth.

The BLRS Report also set out likely costs of revised operations should only the main line section north of Templecombe be closed (these are not referred to further herein).

The BLRS Report then criticised the Beeching Report for failing to consider the ‘basic railway’ concept, i.e., light railways. It accused British Railways of dogmatism in maintaining that ‘unless full quota of Victorian ironmongery and an absolute plethora of staff is utilised, no passenger service can possibly be operated.’ It was quite possible to run a railway under the Light Railway Acts if British Railways cared to make use of them.

The BLRS Report went on to say:

‘It will readily be understood that the operation of a light railway is vastly less expensive and very much simpler than usually obtains. Track and signalling cost, a very heavy feature in most operational accounts, is reduced dramatically. Routes which carry a traffic beneath the contempt of Dr Beeching prove an economic proposition on a light railway. When one considers that the track…is in a reasonable condition (certainly good enough for a light railway) it becomes clear that they could be maintained for many years at an annual cost of a great deal less than the £2,000 pound per mile which is the lowest figure quoted in the Beaching Report.’

The BLSR report then quoted passenger census figures apparently compiled by British Railways (for the S&D main line) and Sturminster Rural District Council (for Templecombe-Bournemouth services) as follows:

Main Line:

Down: 91, 46, 37, 41

Up: 35, 105, 75

Templecombe-Bournemouth:

Down: 80, 52, 37, 15, 12, 27, 14

Up: 23, 20, 12, 18, 50, 39, 14

BLRS Conclusion on the Closure of the S&D

The BLRS Report concluded that it had shown that:

‘the required traffic to make the lines viable financially are not beyond the reach of an enterprising management. All the routes under discussion could, we are convinced, continue to provide a service to the public, either as light railways or in less elaborate guise than at present.’

Comments and Lessons

On reading the BLRS Report, one is struck by the chasm, not only in figures but also in attitude, between British Railways and those such as the BLRS. Clearly British Railways wanted to close the S&D and so represented the financial position of the line in the worst possible light. BLRS wanted to keep the line open and so made sensible suggestions as to how revenue may be increased and costs reduced. It can be argued that both were correct in what they were describing, but one was looking at the current position under current operations, whilst the other was looking at what was possible. Clearly in 1963 the S&D was making significant losses as it was then operated, but equally it could have been operated on a far more economical basis.

The decision to close the S&D was ultimately a political decision made by the Transport Minister. Ultimately, he decided to close the line. On making that decision, a range of issues would have been considered by him. There would be a degree of subjectivity in many of those issues. The odds were certainly stacked against the S&D however closure was not a foregone conclusion, as an alternative to closure did exist, even if only a temporary reprieve to see if a rationalised DMU service could be proved to pay.

Indeed Gerald Fiennes (then general manager of the Western region) made it clear at the time (in an article in a leading railway magazine) that if permission to close the line was not given, a re-designed DMU service was already envisaged for the line.

By 1967 the rules of the game had changed somewhat, as the Labour Government (re-elected in 1966) worked out a new approach for the railways. The subsequent 1968 Railways Act was transformative in many ways, acknowledging that railways provided a valuable service which warranted subsidies in the case of uneconomic lines. This was, of course, something Beeching was not allowed to consider under the Government imposed terms of reference for his report.

It's arguable that the tide was turning and that the views of the Branch Line Reinvigoration Society were gaining ground. By 1968 the number of railway closures were declining and indeed many railways slated for closure under the Beeching Report were reprieved with the benefit of a government subsidy.

There are many lessons here. Modern railways need a significant subsidy and as such are at the mercy of, and subject to the whims of, government. Who would have thought in 1963 that a future government would, 60 years later, commit to spend up to £100 billion for a new high-speed railway of just 200 miles or so. Note however that the Beeching Report came only 8 years after the Government agreed to inject over £1 billion pounds into the railways under the 1955 modernisation plan. The tap can be turned off as quickly as it is turned on.

An important lesson here is that campaigning can work, even if it takes time to succeed. In 1978 the Branch Line Reinvigoration Society merged with the Railway Development Association to form the Railway Development Society, which survives today in the form of Railfuture.

Railfuture remains the country’s leading railway campaign group to this day. A national organisation with 14 branches throughout the UK, it is still campaigning today for a bigger, better railway.

1 September 2023

Blog Archive

August 2023

Rail User Groups and the ‘Rail User Group Annual Awards 2023'

The Railway Club Directory is somewhat unique amongst railway websites in that it is not focussed on railways in general, but rather on railway societies and clubs in all their various forms.

This month’s blog deals with Rail User Groups and Rail Campaign Groups, an interesting category of railway society, as most railway societies today have nostalgia at their root, such as historical ‘line societies’.

Few railway societies today are actively involved in campaigning to improve the railway system in some way. An organisation which does this on a national and branch level is ‘Railfuture’, the advisory and campaign body previously known as the Railway Development Society.

Rail User Groups and Rail Campaign Groups also carry out a campaigning function at the local level. Their interests are usually focused on a particular railway line or station. Their local nature makes them particularly attuned to public opinion in their region. What happens nationally may be interesting, but what happens in the locality sometimes matters more, often resulting in active community involvement. As a consequence, there are a considerable number of local rail user and campaign groups operating in the UK today, indeed well over one hundred.

Many rail user and campaign groups are directly affiliated with ‘Railfuture’, as there is advantage for a local user or campaign group to be associated with a body with an element of national clout, which also has its own active branch system. A good starting point for anyone seeking a local group is through the ‘Railfuture’ website (go to www.railfuture.org.uk/Rail-User-Groups).

The Railway Club Directory website also has a dedicated section on these groups, see ‘Rail User Groups’ and ‘Campaign Groups’, at www.railwayclubdirectory.com/rail-user

Railfuture organises an annual Awards Ceremony for rail user and rail campaign groups. Which brings us to the 2023 ‘Rail User Group Annual Awards’. These were held at the Annual General Meeting of Railfuture held in July, and the winners were as follows:

Best Website: Joint winners Bedwyn Trains RUG and Dartmoor Railway Association

Best Newsletter: Stourbridge Line User Group

Best Social Media: Tarka Rail Association

Best Campaign: Rail Action Group, East of Scotland (RAGE)

Best Campaigner: Joint winners: Barbara Mine (Friends of Bishopstone Station) and Tim Steer (ACE Rail Campaign)

Congratulations to them all. You show railway enthusiasts just what is possible when you get involved.

1 August 2023

Blog Archive:

July 2023

Closure of Local Railway Clubs (Part 2)

We’ve received numerous emails in respect of our June 2023 blog (see below) concerning the recent closure of a few local railway clubs. A theme seems to be that whilst many clubs have falling attendances, some are doing well, and indeed some societies have an increasing (albeit aging) membership.

Presumably railway societies are no different from any other clubs, in that those that are run well will survive and thrive, whereas those that are not will decline.

The writer of this blog recalls a few of his own experiences at attending railway society meetings, which have not always been good. Indeed he has attended numerous society meetings as a visitor, and has been struck by how often visitors and potential new members are pretty much ignored at these meetings. This has occurred not just at small local clubs, but at branch meetings of some of the biggest national railway societies in the country.

It seems the experience of invited speakers at railway society meetings has not been much better. In the foreword to the ‘National Directory of Traditional Railway Societies’, Christian Wolmar mentions that ‘at…times, the welcoming has been less than impressive. I have been left to wander into a room with no one acknowledging my presence or offering me a cup of tea. After some meetings, I have been left at an out of the way railway station with an hour to wait for a train with nowhere to buy so much as a sandwich.’

The UK has no shortage of rail enthusiasts. Just look at the sheer number of heritage railways in the country, the vast number of supporting group members and volunteers that help run them, the substantial circulation of periodic railway magazines, and the near continuous production of TV programmes and series with railway themes. Young enthusiasts also exist, evidenced by the one million followers of the largest site dedicated to UK railways on TikTok. If people are choosing not to join a particular club, it is probably because the club is not offering what they want, in the way that they want it.

Club officials are acutely aware of the aging nature of their membership and the threat that brings to their society. A loss of members is inevitable, and it is therefore self-evident that the only way a club can survive is by the recruitment of new members. However new members of any sort of club will often face the clique mentality of existing members, who naturally see the organisation as ‘their’ society, and do not necessarily see it as their role to welcome others. Club officials would be well advised to reflect on this and consider just how welcoming their society really is to potential new members.

Our answer to club officials worried by falling numbers and age demographics is not necessarily to think bigger, but to think better. Every society should have someone at its meetings whose role it is to welcome members (and speakers), and in particular new members. A ‘social officer’ so to speak. This would take very little additional effort, but could certainly improve the experience of visitors, and who knows, may turn some visitors into new members.

1 July 2023.

Blog Archive:

June 2023

Closure of Local Railway Clubs

It is always sad to learn of the closure of a railway club, especially one that has been in existence for as long as most people will live.

We’re sad to say that ‘The Bournemouth Railway Club’, established 80 years ago, has decided it is time to close. Its last meeting will be held on Saturday 10 June 2023 at the Avon Room, Winton Methodist Community Centre, Heron Court Road, Bournemouth BH9 1DE, at 2.30pm.

The ‘National Directory of Traditional Railway Societies’ describes the Bournemouth Railway Club as follows:

‘The Bournemouth Railway Club (the 'Club') is the oldest railway society in its district and caters for all those with an interest in railways. It was founded in 1943 by the late Rev. A. Cunningham-Burley, who was also Club President from its foundation until his death in 1953.

The Club organises a series of presentations on railway themes during a meeting season. These presentations are held monthly on the second Saturday of the month (2.30pm start) and are given by knowledgeable and often well-known speakers in the railway world.

The Club has members however no annual subscription fees are payable. This is a long-standing position taken by the Club and relates to its aim of wider public benefit. All monthly presentations are open to both members and the public for an entry price, currently £2.50 for adults and £1.25 for juniors. A 'season ticket' for entry to all presentations is available at £25.

The Club issues a newsletter, BRC News, on a bi-monthly basis which contains, amongst other matters, the latest news and events concerning the Club. Members are invited to take out an annual subscription for BRC News, currently at £9 if posted, or £4.80 if collected. Individual editions can also be bought.

The Bournemouth Railway Club Trust is custodian of two large railway photograph collections, the WHC Kelland Collection and the Martyn Thresh Photographic Archive, each of which has been comprehensively catalogued.

The Club organises from time-to-time visits to places of railway interest, some within the UK and some abroad. The Club also has an interest in railway photography with competition between members. The Les Hopkins and George Barlow Cups are awarded each year for best entries. Occasional colour slide competitions are also held, the winner receiving the Martin Shoults Memorial Trophy.’

Covid-19 has negatively affected many local railway clubs whose usual activity relates to the holding of regular (usually monthly) slide shows and presentations. This was the case with the Bournemouth Railway Club. The numbers of attendees to these events had not recovered to pre-covid levels.

Unfortunately other clubs have likewise suffered. Earlier this year, the Nantwich & Market Drayton Railway Society closed, and other clubs, such as the North Wales Railway Circle, the Stafford Railway Society and the Telford Railway Society, remain in abeyance following covid, and may not reopen.

At least for those living in and around the Bournemouth area there is a good selection of railway related societies they could join. The Wimborne Railway Society is just 10 miles up the road, and on the modelling side there is quite a choice including the Poole and District Model Railway Society, the East Dorset Area N Gauge Group and the Central Southern Gauge O Group, and for engineers there is also the Bournemouth & District SME, which runs the Littledown Miniature Railway.

Date: 1 June 2023